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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL POWER TO AMEND THE CON-
STITUTION OF CANADA-REFORM OF THE SENATE .-Does the
federal Parliament have the power to abolish the Senate? The
Supreme Courtof Canada in the Upper House Reference (1979)1 has
just said no . I think the answer should have been yes. This comment
will attempt to explain the decision and to criticize it .
The Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1978, Bill C-60, which
was introduced into the House of Commons of the Parliament of
Canada by Prime Minister Trudeau on June 20th, 1978, was an
elaborate document whichproposed the codification of some parts of
Canada's constitutional law and changes in other parts of the law.
The bill lapsed when the Parliament was dissolved before the
election of May 1979 at which the Trudeau government was
defeated . Now that the Trudeau government has been re-elected
(February 1980) it is possible that a new Bill, along similar lines,
will be re-introduced.
Among many other matters, Bill C-60 proposed to abolish the
Senate and replace it with a new federal Upper House called the
House of the Federation.' Like the present Senate, the new Upper
House wouldbe an appointed not an elected body, and, again like the
present Senate, appointments would be made on a regional basis.
However, unlike the present Senate, whose members are appointed
by the federal government3 and hold office until age seventy-five 4
the members of the new Upper Housewouldbe appointed half by the
provinces and half by the federal government . Each appointing
government would be obliged to make its quota of appointments
anew after each election, and to draw its appointees from the various
1 Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, December 21st, 1979, as yet
unreported . References to passages in the opinion of the court will be identified by
the page number in the typed reasons for judgment issued by the court.
2 Bill C-60, ss 62-70.
s British North America Act, 1867, 30 &31 Vic., c. 3 (U.K .), s. 24, hereinafter
cited as B.N.A . Act.
' Ibid ., s. 29 .
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political parties on the basis of proportional representation based on
the voting in the election . Thus, after a federal election the federal
government would make a new set of appointments of half the Upper
House in accordance with the results of the election, and after a
provincial election the government of that province would make a
new set of appointments from that province in accordance with the
results of the provincial election .
As well as these changes in the appointment and tenure of
members of the Upper House, the powers of the Upper House were
to be reduced . Whereas the present Senate has virtually the same
powers over legislation as the House of Commons,' the new Upper
House would have only temporary delaying power and could be
by-passed by the House of Commons after two months . In this
respect, Bill C-60 was following the lead taken by the United
Kingdom, which by the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 reduced
the power of the House of Lords to a suspensory veto .s
These proposals for a new Upper House stirred considerable
controversy . One of the points of controversy was whether the
federal Parliament had the power to enact the proposals . After
testimony had been given before a special joint committee of the
Senate and the House of Commons by Professor W.R . Lederman
denying that the federal Parliament had the requisite legislative
power,' the federal government directed a reference to the Supreme
Court of Canada. The reference did not in terms ask the court to
determine the constitutionality of the proposals of Bill C-60 . It posed
a series of questions which were designed not only to determine the
constitutionality of the proposals in the Bill, but also to test the
constitutionality of various other possible measures of Upper House
reform . The questions referred to the court were as follows :
1 . Is it within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada to repeal
sections 21 to 36 of the British North America Act, 1867, as amended, and
s The only exception is s . 53 ofthe B.N.A. Act, requiring that money bills must
originate in the House of Commons .
s The general effect of the Parliament Acts of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo . 5, c . 13, and
1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo . 6, c . 103, is to confine the House of Lords to a suspensory
veto of only one month for money bills and thirteen months for other bills . At the end
of the stipulated period of delay a bill can be enacted into law without the assent of
the House of Lords . See S.A . de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd
ed ., 1977), pp . 294-298 .
' Evidence of W.R . Lederman, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the
Constitution of Canada, 3rd session of the 30th Parliament, 1977-78, August 23rd,
1978 . Professor Lederman's views correctly anticipated the decision ofthe Supreme
Court of Canada, in striking contrast to the testimony of a later witness who argued
confidently that the federal Parliament did have the requisite power: Evidence of




to amend other sections thereof so as to delete any reference to an Upper
House or the Senate? If not, in what particular or particulars and to what
extent?
2. Is it within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada to enact
legislation altering, or providing a replacement for, the Upper House of
Parliament, so as to effect any or all of the following:
(a) to change the name of the Upper House;
(b) to change the, numbers and proportions of members by whom provinces
and territories are represented in that House;
(c) to change the qualifications of members of that House;
(d) to change the tenure of members of that House;
(e) to change the method by which members of that House are chosen by
1° Ibid ., at p. 20 .
(i) conferring authority on provincial legislative assemblies to select,
on the nomination of the respective Lieutenant Governors in
Council, some members of the Upper House, and, if a legislative
assembly had not selected such members within the time permit-
ted, authority on the House of Commons to select those members
on the nomination of the Governor General in Council, and
(ii) conferring authority on the House of Commons to select, on the
nomination of the Governor General in Council, some members of
the Upper House from each province, and, if the House of
Commons has not selected such members from a province within
the time permitted, authority on the legislative assembly of the
province to select those members on the nomination of the
Lieutenant Governor in Council,
(iïi) conferring authority on the Lieutenant Governors in Council of the
provinces or on some other body or bodies to select some or all of
the members of the Upper House, or
(iv) providing for the direct election of all or some of the members of
the Upper House by the public ; or
(f) to provide that Bills approved by the House ofCommons could be given
assent and the force of law after the passage of a certain period oftime
notwithstanding that the Upper House has not approved them?
If not, in what particular or particulars and to what extent?
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous opinion of "the
court",8 interpreted the first question as asking whether the federal
Parliament had the legislative authority to abolish the Senate, and it
answered the question no . The court considered that some parts of
the second question could not be answered "in the absence of a
factual context or actual draft legislation",' but the court held that
the federal Parliament could not alter the powers of the Senate so as
to "seriously impair the position of the Senate in the legislative
process" . 1° This meant that the federal Parliament could not follow
a No individual judge is identified as the author of the opinion. The Bench
consisted of eight judges, Beetz J. not participating .
s Supra, footnote 1, at p . 21 .
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the United Kingdom precedent" and enact a provision that, after a
period of delay, a bill could become law without the assent of the
Upper House. The court also held that changes in the "fundamental
features, or essential characteristics"" of the Senate were incompe-
tent to the federal Parliament . These essential characteristics were
not clearly identified, but they seem to consist of (a) regional
representation, which would preclude an upper house composed on
some basis other than region, and (b) appointment by the federal
government, which would preclude the direct election of members or
even a provincial role in appointments .
History of section 91(1)
The case turned on the extent of the federal Parliament's power
under section 91(1) of the British North America Act . Section 91(1)
gives to the federal Parliament the power to make laws in relation to :
The amendment from time to time of the Constitution of Canada, except as
regards matters coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, or as regards rights or
privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act granted or secured to the
Legislature or the Government of a province, or to any class of persons with
respect to schools or as regards the use of the English or the French language or
as regards the requirements that there shall be a session of the Parliament of
Canada at least once each year, and that no House ofCommons shall continue
for more than five years from the day of the return ofthe Writs for choosing the
House : Provided, however, that a House of Commons may in time of real or
apprehended war, invasion or insurrection be continued by the Parliament of
Canada if such continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third
of the members of such House .
This head of power was not in the B .N.A . Act as originally
enacted . It was added in 1949 by an amendment which was enacted
by the United Kingdom (or imperial) Parliament as the British North
America (No. 2) Act, 1949. 13 This amendment was enacted at the
request of the Canadian government, of course, but it created some
controversy in Canada because the joint address of the Senate and
Commons which made the request had not been preceded by the
agreement of the provinces . Several provincial premiers were
opposed to the amendment on the ground that the whole question of
amending the constitution should be left until agreement with the
provinces had been achieved . Prime Minister St. Laurent responded
by saying that the amendment would give to the federal Parliament
no more than the provinces had always enjoyed under section 92(1)
of the B.N.A. Act (which empowers each provincial Legislature to
amend "the constitution of the province")," and that provincial
" Supra, footnote 6 .
12 Supra, footnote I, at p . 23 .
's 13 Geo . VI, c . 81 (U.K .) ; R .S.C . 1970, Appendix II, No . 31 .




concerns were unjustified because of the extensive exceptions
expressly written into the new head of power. 15
Use of section 91(1)
There is no doubt that section 91(1) authorizes the federal
Parliament to amend the B .N.A. Act . 16 In fact, since the acquisition
of the new power in 1949, the federal Parliament has used section
91(1) to amend the B .N .A . Act five times : (1) In 1952 the federal
Parliament amended section 51 of the B .N .A . Act, which provides a
formula for the regular readjustment of representation in the House
of Commons ." (2) In 1965 the federal Parliament amended section
29 of the B .N.A . Act, which gave senators tenure for life, and
imposed compulsory retirement at age seventy-five . 18 (3) In 1974 the
federal Parliament again amended section 51 of the B .N.A. Act
(item (1) above), substituting a new formula for the regular
readjustment of representation in the House of Commons." (4) In
1975 the federal Parliament again amended section 51 of the B .N.A.
Act, this time to increase the representation of the Northwest
Territories in the House of Commons from one member to two.2° (5)
In 1975 the federal Parliament amended sections 21 and 22 of the
B .N.A . Act by increasing the number of senators from 102 to 104
and giving to each of the Yukon Territory and the Northwest
Territories one member of the Senate."
Before 1949 at least three of these five amendments would have
had to have been enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament . 22 Each
was uncontroversial . The Supreme Court of Canada in the Upper
House Reference described them as federal "housekeeping" mat-
ters .23 The court did not doubt that each was valid : each was within
the meaning of "the constitution of Canada", and each was outside
the five exceptions written into section 91(1) .
is The legislative history of s. 92(1) is related in Paul G6rin-Lajoie, Constitu-
tional Amendment in Canada (1950), pp . xiv-xxxv .
18 Curiously, s. 91(1) does not include the phrase "notwithstanding anything in
this Act" which is found in s. 92(1) .
17 British North America Act, 1952, S.C ., 1952, c. 15 .
18 British North America Act, 1965, S.C ., 1965, c. 4.
is British North America Act (No. 2), 1974, S.C ., 1974-75-76, c. 13 .
,2° British North America Act, 1975, S.C ., 1974-75-76, c. 28 .
21 British North America Act (No. 2), 1975, S.C ., 1974-75-76, c. 53 .
22 The fourth and fifth could probably have been enacted by the federal
Parliament by virtue of the British North America Act, 1886, 49-50 Vic., c. 35
(U.K .), s . 1, which permits the Parliament to provide for representation of federal
territories .
23 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 9. .
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Meaning of "the constitution of Canada"
The restrained use of section 91(1) since its adoption in 1949
never provided an occasion for a judicial interpretation of the phrase
"the constitution of Canada" . In this phrase, as in other constitu
tional contexts ,24 the word "Canada" is ambiguous . It could mean
the country as a whole ("Canada as a geographical unit")" or it
could mean the central government ("the juristic federal unit' 1)26 as
opposed to the provincial governments .
Professor F.R . Scott argued for the former view-the wide
view . He argued that "there is no separate `federal' constitution ; the
constitution is a single body of law setting up and apportioning
authority to different organs of the state, some federal and some
provincial" ." On this view, the phrase "the constitution of
Canada" included all constitutional rules, including even the
constitutions of the various provinces . Its scope was limited only by
the terms of the five exceptions in section 91(1) . On this view, the
phrase would obviously include the Senate and the only question
would be whether the abolition or alteration of the Senate was
precluded by one of the exceptions in section 91(1) . (None of the
exceptions are in fact applicable .)28
In Jones v . Attorney General of New Brunswick (1974)29 the
Supreme Court of Canada accepted Scott's wide view of "the
constitution of Canada" . In that case it was argued that the federal
Official Languages Act was unconstitutional on the basis of the
fourth exception to section 91(1) . The fourth exception to section
91(1) precludes the amendment of the constitution of Canada "as
regards the use of the English or the French language" . Laskin
C.J., writing for a unanimous nine-judge court, held that this
exception, while it precluded the taking away of the language rights
guaranteed by section 133 of the B .N.A . Act, did not preclude the
24 For discussion of the semantic problem, see P.W . Hogg, Constitutional Law
of Canada (1977), p. 34 .
ss Supra, footnote 1, at p. 14 .
2s Ibid .
27 F.R . Scott, The British North America Act (No. 2), 1949 (1949) . 8 U. T. L.J .
201, at p. 203; Essays on the Constitution (1977), p. 204. Accord, StephenA. Scott,
Bill C-60 : Or, HowNot to Draft a Constitution (1979), 57 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at pp .
593-596.
28 Only the second exception to s. 91(1) is conceivably applicable . The second
exception protects "rights or privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act
granted or secured to the Legislature or Government of a province", but it is hard to
see how the abolition of the Senate affects a right or privilege granted or secured to
"the Legislature or Government ofa province" : see Stephen A. Scott, op . cit., ibid.,
at p . 596. In the Upper House Reference the Supreme Court of Canada never
suggested that any of the exceptions would cover this case .




grant of new language rights . Since the Official Languages Act only
granted new language rights it was not affected by the exception . In
reaching this result, Laskin C.J . had this to say :3o
I am not called upon here - to state exhaustively what is comprehended within
the phrase in s.91(1) "the constitution of Canada" . It certainly includes the
British North America Act, 1867 and its amendments, and hence includes
s .133 . What is excepted from Parliament's amending power under s .91(l)
includes an exception as regards the use of the English or French language .
Parliament is forbidden to amend the Constitution of Canada as regards the use
of either of the languages, and s.91(1) therefore points to the provisions ofthe
constitution dealing therewith, and thus to s.133 . See Scott, "The British
North America (No. 2) Act, 1949" (1950), 8 Univ . ofTor. L.J . 201, at p. 205.
In this passage, I believe that his lordship is saying that the whole of
the British North America Act is part of the constitution of Canada .
He is certainly saying that section 133 is part of the constitution of
Canada despite the fact that section 133 guarantees the use ofthe two
languages in the Legislature and courts of Quebec as well as in the
federal Parliament and federal courts . Add to this the citation of
Professor Scott's article, and it is rather clear that Professor Scott's
thesis has been accepted .
The narrow reading of the phrase "the constitution of Canada"
assumes that the various constitutional rules can be divided into a
"federal" constitution and ten "provincial" constitutions, and that
the phrase "the constitution of Canada" encompasses only the
former class of rules . In the Upper House Reference the Supreme
Court of Canada accepted this narrow reading . The court said that
the phrase "the constitution of Canada" "does not mean the whole
of the British North America Act, but means the constitution of the
federal government, as distinct from the provincial governments" ."
This dictum appears to be flatly inconsistent with the previously-
quoted dictum in the Jones case" which had been agreed to only five
years earlier by a unanimous court which included five of the same
judges as decided the Upper House Reference . Yet, astonishingly,
the dictum in the Upper House Reference is not accompanied by any
acknowledgement, let alone explanation, of the earlier Jones
dictum .
Not . only did the Supreme Court of Canada adopt inconsistent
positions on the meaning of "the constitution of Canada" in the
Jones case and Upper House Reference, in neither case did the court
offer any reasons for the position taken . A commentator is therefore
unusually free to express his own opinion on the preferable position .
In support of the wide interpretation, one could invoke the width of
3° Ibid ., at pp. 196-197 .
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the five exceptions which are carved out of the legislative power
conferred by section 91(1), These exceptions include "matters
coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces", and "rights or
privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act granted or secured
to the Legislature or the Government of a Province" . 33 Professor
Stephen A . Scott, taking the same wide view as Professor F.R .
Scott, has argued that the phrase "the constitution of Canada" must
be "of the widest possible ambit", because the phrase must "define
a category wide enough 'to allow the (large and important)
enumerated exceptions to be drawn or deducted from it, . 34 This
argument for the wide interpretation of section 91(1) is forceful, but
not conclusive . The exceptions to section 91(1) could have been
included out of an abundance of caution to assure the provincial
critics of the 1949 amendment which added section 91(1) that no
diminution of provincial powers, rights or privileges was intended .
In my opinion, the preferable interpretation of "the constitution
of Canada" is the narrow one-the one espoused in the Upper Hoarse
Reference . The reason for my opinion is the existence of the
provincial power of amendment in section 92(1) of the B .N .A . Act .
Section 92(l) (which, unlike section 91(l), has been in the B .N .A .
Act from the beginning) gives to each provincial Legislature the
power to make laws in relation to :
The amendment from time to time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of the
constitution of the province, except as regards the office of Lieutenant
Governor .
The existence of provincial power to amend "the constitution of the
province" suggests that the phrase "the constitution of Canada"
was intended to identify a "federal" constitution which would
exclude the constitutions of the provinces . It will be recalled that
Prime Minister St . Laurent, in defending the adoption of section
91(l) without prior provincial consent, emphasized the parallel
between the existing section 92(l) and the new section 91(l),"
Commentators other than Professors F.R . Scott and Stephen A. Scott
have tended to emphasize the same parallel."
Assuming that the narrow meaning of "the constitution of
Canada" is correct, does the phrase include the Senate of Canada'? In
my opinion, the answer must be yes . It has never been doubted that a
33 The full text of s . 91(1) is set out supra .
34 Stephen A . Scott, op . cit ., footnote 27, at p . 593 .
35 Supra .
3s Gérin-Lajoie, op . cit., footnote 15, pp . xxxi-xxxii ; Favreau . The Amendment
ofthe Constitution ofCanada (1965), p . 9 ; Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd




province can abolish its upper house as an amendment to the
constitution of the province, and in fact Manitoba, New Brunswick,
Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Quebec have done so ." In
the case of Quebec the upper house (the Legislative Council) was
established by the B.N .A . Act, sections 71-79; but its abolition in
1968 was accomplished by ordinary provincial statute enacted under
section 92(1) .38 Surely, it is equally clear that the federal Upper
House is part of the constitution of Canada . Thus, Dr . Paul
Gérin-Lajoie, not a commentator who is likely to exaggerate the
extent of federal power, says of section 91(1) :39
It maybe more accurately described as a power mainly to alter the structure of
the central government machinery and the rules governing its functioning. For
instance, the Senate could be remodelled or abolished; . . .
And Senator Eugene Eorsey, not a commentator who is likely to
exaggerate the vulnerability of Senate or monarchy, says that under
section 91(1) the federal Parliament :4o
. . . could abolish the Senate, or the monarchy, by ordinary Act; . . .
Matters "of interest" to the Federal Government
Yetin the UpperHouse Reference the Supreme Court of Canada
held that section 91(1) did not authorize the abolition or substantial
alteration of the Senate . How was the court able to reach that result?
The passage in whichthe court defined "the constitution of Canada"
reads as follows :"
In our opinion, the word "Canada" as used in 9.91(1) does not referto Canada
as a geographical unit but refers to the juristic federal unit . "Constitution of
Canada" does not mean the whole of the British North America Act, but means
the constitution of the federal government, as distinct from the provincial
governments . The power of amendment conferred by 9.91(1) is limited to
matters of interest only to the federal government .
It will be observed that there is a slide in the reasoning in this
passage . The last sentence does not follow from the first two. It does
not follow from the fact that the constitution of Canada means the
constitution of the federal government that the power of amendment
conferred by section 91(1) is limited "to matters of interest only to
the federal government" . Yet this limitation is repeated even more
explicitly one page later: 42
ar Forsey, Freedom and Order (1974), p . 227.
38 Act respecting the Legislative Council of Quebec, S .Q ., 1968, c. 9.
38 Gérin-Lajoie, op . cit., footnote 15, p. xxxi .
41 Forsey, op . cit., footnote 37, p. 232.
41 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 14 .
42 Ibid ., at p . 15 .
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In our opinion, the power of amendment given by s.91(1) relates to the
constitution of the federal government in matters of interest only to that
government .
What the court is saying is that, while the phrase "the
constitution of Canada" means the constitution of the federal
government, the power to amend the constitution of Canada
authorizes amendments to the constitution of the federal government
only if the amendments are of interest only to that government .
Nowhere does the court justify this additional limitation on federal
power under section 91(1) . There is nothing in the language of
section 91(1) to justify such an interpolation . Section 91(1) simply
refers to "the constitution of Canada" . None of the five exceptions
to federal power speak in express terms or by implication about
matters of interest only to the federal government. Indeed, the court
assumed, correctly in my view, that none of the exceptions were
relevant in this case . 43
That little interpolation by the court seems to me to be the key to
the result . The court never expressly denied that the Senate is part of
the constitution ofCanada . It is hard to see how that could be denied .
Although the opinion is not quite clear on the point, what it seems to
be denying is that the Senate is of interest only to the federal
government. Historically, of course, the Senate was an important
part ofthe confederation arrangements since it was designed to offset
representation by population in the House of Commons by according
equal representation in the Senate to each of the three (later four)
regions of Canada . In the Upper House Reference the court alluded
several times to the role of the Senate as a protector of the more
lightly populated regions of the country ." The conclusion of this line
of reasoning is that the Senate is a body which is not merely "of
interest only to the federal government" . Therefore, once the
interpolation has been parachuted into section 91(1), section 91(1)
does not authorize the abolition or fundamental alteration of the
Senate .
The main difficulty with this line of reasoning is, as argued
above, that there is no legal basis for the interpolation of the
requirement that an amendment be "of interest only to the federal
government" . However, even if the court is granted its interpolation,
the reasoning is seriously deficient . If it is relevant to look at the
intended function of the Senate as a protector of the more lightly
populated regions of the country, is it not even more to the point to
notice that the Senate has never actually performed this function?
The Senate's failure to serve as an effective protector of regional or
as Supra, footnote 28 .




provincial interests is agreed to by all scholars," and indeed is
obvious to all readers of newspapers . Therefore, even the complete
abolition of the federal Upper House would have no significant
impact on regional or provincial interests .
The fact is however that most current proposals for Senate
reform, including the proposals in Bill C-60, do not contemplate the
complete abolition of a federal Upper House . What they contemplate
is its reform into, or replacement by, an Upper House which will be
an effective protector of regional or provincial interests . Yet, the
court's decision in the Upper House Reference denies the possibility
of even this kind of reform . The court insisted that the appointment
of members of the Upper House by the federal government was an
essential characteristic of the Upper House which could not be
altered under section 91(1) . 46 This is ironic, because the federal
appointment of members is the feature which above all else has
prevented the Senate from being an effective defender of regional or
provincial interests .47 A move to a provincially-appointed Upper
House, whatever the other disadvantages of such a body, would
obviously . make the Upper House a more effective defender of
provincial interests . And direct election, if one may judge from the
position in Australia,18 would make the Upper House a more
assertive body . Yet, according to the Supreme Court of Canada,
neither of these changes can be accomplished under section 91(1) .
It really is a puzzle to me that the court should have fastened
upon the Senate's appointed feature as one of those essentials which
cannot be amended under section 91(1) . Why, for example, is a
change to direct election held to be outside the range of section 91(1)
amendments? Only a full quotation will do justice to the court's
opinion on this point : 49
Sub-question (e)(iv) deals with the possible selection of all or some members of
the Senate by direct election by the public . The substitution of a system of
" Dawson, The Government of Canada (5th ed ., 1970), ch. 15; Mallory, The
Structure of Canadian Government (1971), ch . 6; McConnell, Commentary on the
British North America Act (1977), p. 66 . The Senate has, of course, performed the
function of reviewing legislation-but not for the purpose of protecting the smaller
provinces.
45 .
as Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 22-23 .
4' This is abundantly demonstrated by Dawson and Mallory, op. cit., footnote
's The Australian Senate, an elected body, denied supply to the government of
Prime Minister Whitlam in 1974 and 1975 ; the latter event led to the dismissal of the
Prime Minister. Such bursts of independence are unknown in Canada because the
Senate is appointed . The American Senate, another elected body, is even more
independent, but it is not analogous because of the differences between the
presidential and parliamentary systems of government .
11, Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 22-23.
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election for a system of appointment would involve a radical changé in the
nature of one of the component parts of Parliament . As already noted, the
preamble to the Act referred to "a constitution similar in principle to that of the
United Kingdom", where the Upper House is not elected. In creating the
Senate in the manner provided in the Act, it is clear that the intention was to
make the Senate a thoroughly independent body which could canvass
dispassionately the measures of the House of Commons . This was ac-
complished by providing for the appointment of members of the Senate with
tenure for life. To make the Senate a wholly or partially elected body would
affect a fundamental feature of that body . We would answer this sub-question
in the negative .
What an extraordinary melange of law and political science is
embodied in this passage! The idea that the Senate would somehow
become a less "thoroughly independent" body if election were
substituted for appointment will amaze political scientists . And the
idea that a "constitution similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom" requires an appointed upper house ignores the hereditary
and aristocratic character of much of the House of Lords. What is
also ignored is the fact that the constitution of the United Kingdom
permitted the powers of the House of Lords to be reduced to a
suspensory veto by the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949,5° and
would permit the House of Lords to be converted to an elected body
if that became the policy of the United Kingdom government . The
court focuses reverently on the archaic forms of the United Kingdom
constitution and forgets its dynamic (and more fundamental)
capacity for change .
My opinion in summary, therefore, is that : (1) The court was
wrong to interpolate the requirement that an amendment under
section 91(1) must be "of interest only to the federal government" ;
(2) even if the requirement is interpolated, the abolition or alteration
of the Senate as presently constituted satisfies the requirement
because the Senate does not function as a protector of regional or
provincial interests ; and (3) the court's decision actually precludes
reforms which would convert the Senate into an Upper House which
would be an effective protector of regional or provincial interests .
Textual References to the Senate
As well as the argument that Upper House reform is not of
interest only to the federal government, the court relied on the
explicit reference to the Senate in the opening words of section 91 .
Section 91 confers federal legislative power on "the Queen, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of
Commons" . The court held that this phraseology implied that the
nature and function of the Senate could not be essentially changed




under section 91(1) .51 The court made a similar inference from a
reference to "the Parliament of Canada" in one of the exceptions to
section 91(1) itself. Since "the Parliament of Canada" was defined
in section 17 of the B .N.A. Act as including the Senate, it followed
that section 91(1) did not contemplate changes in the Senate.5 2
These arguments, based as they are on textual analysis of the
B .N.A . Act, seem to me to be more persuasive than the argument
based on the court's own self-created (and misapplied) requirement
that a law under section 91(1) must be "of interest only" to the
federal government. But the textual arguments seem to me to be
quite inconclusive . Is it not equally plausible to argue that the
references in the B .N.A . Act to the Senate and the Parliament are
references to bodies which are vulnerable to change under the power
to amend "the constitution of Canada"? There is authority for the
proposition that such change could not go so far as to eliminate
representative democratic institutions," but the amendment or even
abolition of the Upper House is hardly a threat to representative
democracy .
In any event, why are these arguments by inference not
applicable to the provinces? It will be recalled that five provinces
have abolished their upper houses as amendments to "the constitu
tion of the province."" The court did not cast doubt on the validity
of those abolitions . It said that provincial power was more extensive
than federal power because section 92 does not "particularize the
participants in the law making process" ." Whereas section 91 refers
to "the Queen with the advice and consent of the Senate and House
of Commons", section 92 simply refers to "the Legislature" . In
addition, the court said, section 92(1) does not itself contain any
references which could be interpreted as contemplating the con-
tinued existence of, the provincial upper houses.ss With respect,
these distinctions are not satisfactory . The court failed to notice that
the Legislature of Quebec is defined in section 71 of the B .N.A . Act
in terms very similar to the definition of the Parliament of Canada in
section, 17 of the B .N.A. Act . Compare the two sections :
si Supra, footnote 1, at p . 12 .
11 Ibid ., at p . 18 .
sa Initiative and Referendum Reference, [19191 A.C . 935, at p . 945 . In the
Upper House Reference, supra, footnote 1, at pp . 17-19, the court gave a much
broader reading to the dictum in the Initiative andReferendum Reference than I think
the language in context will bear . For my interpretation, see Hogg, op . cit., footnote
24, pp . 220-223 .
54 Supra .
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17 . There shall be one Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an
Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons.
71 . There shall be a Legislature for Quebec consisting of the Lieutenant
Governor and of two houses, styled the Legislative Council of Quebec and
the Legislative Assembly of Quebec .
Surely the reference to "the Legislature" in section 92, in its
application to Quebec, incorporates the definition in section 71 no
less than a reference to the Parliament of Canada incorporates the
definition in section 17 . On this basis, section 92 is not very different
from section 91 . The line of reasoning favoured by the Supreme
Court of Canada, if applied to Quebec, would suggest that Quebec's
abolition of its upper house in 1968 was unconstitutional ; if so, then
all Quebec laws enacted since 1968-all of which lack the assent of
the Legislative Council-are invalid .
The better view of the law, in my opinion, is that the references
in the B .N.A . Act to the Senate, the Parliament and the Legislatures
are not intended to immunize those institutions from change . The
powers to amend the constitution of Canada and the constitution of
the province should be given a fair reading as including the organs of
legislative power . Nor, in my view, is there any textual justification
for the court's limitation of section 91(1) to "matters of interest only
to the federal government" . I therefore conclude that the Upper
House Reference was wrongly decided . In my opinion, section 91(1)
should have been interpreted as authorizing the federal Parliament to
abolish or alter the Senate .
As a matter of policy, the decision also seems unfortunate . It
means that substantial reform of the Senate cannot be accomplished
by federal legislation . While the Trudeau government's specific
proposals for the House of the Federation in Bill C-60 did not attract
much support, the government was not wedded to the specifics and
was embarked on a process of legislative hearings and broad
provincial and private consultation which would eventually have
yielded different proposals . For those who believe in Upper House
reform here was a realistic opportunity of achieving it . This decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada means that Upper House reform can
only be accomplished by an amendment to the B .N .A . Act enacted
by the United Kingdom (imperial) Parliament . If, as many will
claim, a Canadian request for a United Kingdom amendment must be
preceded not merely by consultation but by the unanimous consent of
all provincial governments, then the experience of the last ten years
suggests that nothing will happen. It is a very significant fact that
British Columbia, the only province which has seriously espoused
the cause of Upper House reform, s' was not one of the seven
57 British Columbia's Constitutional Proposals (Province of B.C ., September




provinces which intervened in the litigation to oppose federal
powers$ The decision is a victory for those who wish the Senate to
remain exactly the way it is now.
Beyond the question of UpperHouse reform, it is unfortunate in
my view that the federal power to make changes in the institutions of
the central government is hedged about with the vague yet sweeping
limitations which proved fatal in this case. Very few changes in the
institutions of the central government could be confidently described
as being of interest only to the federal government. Consider, for
example, the proposal advanced by the Task Force on Canadian
Unity to elect a part of the House of Commons on the basis of
proportional representation ; the idea is to make the House of
Commons more reflective of the true distribution of party allegiance
by region." Could this be accomplished by the federal Parliament as
an amendment to the constitution of Canada? Before the present
decision one could have confidently answered yes. But no confident
answer can be given now . Is this of interest only to the federal
government? Is the simple-majority single-member-constituency
electoral system, which has been in place since confederation,", an
"essential characteristic" of the House of Commons which (accord-
ing to this decision) cannot be altered? No one knows the answer to
these questions . 61 From now on the federal government is going to
have to ask the court for permission before enacting any significant
measure under section 91(1), and the court is often going to say no .
In this country one has to be strong to believe in constitutional
reform ..62
P . Vd . HOGG*
58 Manitoba and Quebec were the other provinces which remained aloof from
the litigation .
Ss The Task Force on Canadian. Unity, A Future Together (Minister of Supply
and Services Canada, 1979), pp. 105-106.
so The Canadian House of Commons has for most of its life had several
two-member constituencies, although there has been none since 1966 : Qualter, The
Election Process in Canada (1970), p . 118 . But a system of proportional
representation based on districts as large as a province would be a radical departure
from tradition . See generally Irvine, Does Canada Need a New Electoral System?
(1979) .
61 It is ominous to note that in the Upper House Reference the court denied
federal power to provide for the direct election of all or some of the members of the
Upper House, even though direct election would not diminish regional representa-
tion : supra.
11 1 acknowledge the help of my colleagues, Professors James C. MacPherson
and Donald V. Smiley, who read an earlier draft of this Comment and made useful
suggestions for its improvement.
* P.W . Hogg, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
